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1 
Chapter Nine 
Importing Forensic Biomedicine into Asylum 
Adjudication: Genetic Ancestry and Isotope Testing in 
the United Kingdom 
Richard Tutton, Christine Hauskeller, and Steve Sturdy 
When refugees apply for asylum, they have to relate a narrative of their persecution in 
their country of origin. Evaluating the veracity or otherwise of these narratives is central 
to the asylum adjudication process. Over the past decade or so, determination of national 
identity has become vitally important in assessing whether someone claiming the right to 
asylum is a legitimate refugee or an economic migrant. Border agencies have focused 
increasingly on the possibility that economic migrants might pose as citizens of particular 
countries in order to gain access to Britain as recognized refugees. This phenomenon has 
become known as “nationality swapping.” Border control agencies have introduced 
several methods to eliminate supposed pretend asylum seekers. In this chapter we discuss 
the Human Provenance Pilot Project (H.P.P.P.) conducted in 2009–10 by the U.K. Border 
Agency (U.K.B.A.) that investigated the utility of genetic ancestry and isotope testing as 
means of corroborating refugees’ nationality claims. At its launch, the H.P.P.P. was 
heavily criticized by leading scientists, journalists, and parliamentarians on scientific as 
well as ethical grounds. In response, the U.K.B.A. scaled it back to a small pilot study 
that came to an end in spring 2010. Over a year later, in June 2011, the U.K.B.A. finally 
announced that the tested techniques would not be introduced into asylum procedures, at 
least for the time being.1 
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The use of molecular biological techniques for determining nationality – an 
exclusively political category – is clearly a highly problematic endeavor. The fact that the 
U.K.B.A. should have taken an interest in using such technologies in the first place, and 
then persisted with trialing them in the face of concerted scientific opposition, appears at 
first sight to be rather surprising. However, closer analysis reveals that the Border 
Agency’s turn to these technologies is quite in keeping with the increasingly prejudicial 
tenor of asylum policy and practice within the United Kingdom. As we show in this 
chapter, the molecular technologies of genetic ancestry and isotope testing had previously 
been employed for forensic purposes in criminal investigations, and they were imported 
into asylum adjudication directly from that context. Their adoption by the U.K.B.A. is 
indicative of a growing tendency on the part of the British immigration authorities to 
adopt forms of expert inquiry and knowledge production developed originally for 
purposes of criminal investigation, and to redirect that expertise to the work of 
challenging asylum seekers’ personal testimony. 
This chapter situates and examines these events in the context of changing 
immigration and asylum policies in what is often referred to as “Fortress Europe.”2 The 
entanglement of border control technologies and immigration policies and practices with 
discourses of race, national identity, and belonging has long been a focus of scholarly 
interest (Fox et al. 2012). Official and popular attitudes to those who request sanctuary 
have become dominated by a hermeneutic of suspicion. Public and policy discourse 
portrays them as mostly ‘bogus’ refugees who seek admission to the country for 
economic, not humanitarian reasons. This attitude shapes the practices and technologies 
of border control. We argue that the H.P.P.P. is only one move in a wider campaign to 
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subject vulnerable individuals to biometric and other identification practices established 
in the treatment of crime suspects. This interpretation is supported by other researchers 
who have also pointed out how increasingly exclusionary immigration policies, and an 
increasingly close integration of immigration with criminal law, have tended towards de 
facto criminalization of asylum seekers in both Europe and North America (Arat-Koc 
1999; Miller 2003; Silveira Gorski 2008; Schuster 2011). The importation of forms of 
expertise developed specifically for the purpose of investigating criminal behavior is part 
of a wider de facto criminalization of asylum applicants that suspends their basic human 
rights until proven innocent of lying and nationality fraud. Meanwhile, increasingly 
exclusionary border controls have fuelled the business of human trafficking, because it 
has become so difficult for refugees to reach a safe country with minimal risk to personal 
safety and without loss of identity, dignity and the power of self-determination. While so 
far unsuccessful, the H.P.P.P. contributed to a vicious circle of criminalization and 
victimization of asylum seekers. The H.P.P.P. also shows how asylum seekers’ 
testimonies of persecution, and of why and how they came into the country, are replaced 
more and more by impersonal methods of assessing eligibility. Border controls rely on 
new forms of expert testimony that distort the standards and principles originally 
envisioned by the process of refugee status determination. 
The Recent History of U.K. Border Control 
Although migration and providing refuge to victims of persecution are different legal, 
administrative, and moral categories, in the British context asylum and the wider debates 
about migration have become closely related in public discourse.3 Both are highly 
politicized, and their history is worth outlining briefly in order to set the historical context 
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of the H.P.P.P. In the United Kingdom, the 1905 Aliens Act marked the inception of a 
modern apparatus of border control as a response to growing migration by Jews fleeing 
persecution in Eastern European countries. This and subsequent measures built up a 
distinction between British subjects and aliens, individuals who do not owe allegiance to 
the British crown. In the aftermath of World War II, United Nations Conventions on 
Human Rights (1948) and the Rights of Refugees (1951) were signed and ratified by the 
United Kingdom. These conventions enshrine the right to refuge and protection from 
persecution for all humans. In the 1950s and 1960s, however, the British economy faced 
a shortage of labor in certain areas and people from the Commonwealth, specifically from 
the Caribbean territories, were actively encouraged to migrate to Britain as guest workers. 
Analysis of Cabinet discussions of that time indicates that “colour was at the root of the 
government’s objections to West Indian workers” migrating to Britain in the 1950s 
(Clayton 2012: 9). Despite such objections, tens of thousands of people migrated from 
Commonwealth states to Britain where they faced varying degrees of hostility. New laws 
were enforced to counter discrimination, whilst simultaneously a series of legislative 
interventions aimed at preventing the continued migration of people from certain 
Commonwealth countries were also enacted. The 1962 Commonwealth Immigrants Act 
distinguished between persons who were born in the United Kingdom or the Republic of 
Ireland and held passports issued by those countries and persons who did not. In practice, 
however, guidance provided to immigration officers indicated that the new law did not 
apply to white migrants from Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and South Africa who 
faced fewer obstacles in gaining entry. Subsequent legislation such as the 1968 
Commonwealth Immigrants Act, the 1971 Immigration Act, and the 1981 British 
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Nationality Act, led to a fundamental change in the principles on which citizenship and 
rights of migration were founded, away from place to birth (jus soli) to “blood relations” 
(jus sanguinis). The right to family in the Human Rights Convention is one pillar on 
which the immigration of family members was based, and led to the introduction of 
genetic testing to confirm biological kinship in the immigration context in Britain in the 
1980s. 
Since the early 1990s, the legitimacy of those applying for asylum has been a hot 
political issue and the perennial interest of right-wing tabloid journalism using an 
aggressive derogatory rhetoric. Journalistic commentators argue that the British tabloid 
press came increasingly to depict asylum seekers as a separate minority group. 
They have been made into scapegoats for a variety of society’s current ills […] To 
this end, editors have sought to forge a unity of viewpoint between the indigenous 
white population and second and third generation Afro-Caribbean and Asian 
immigrants in opposition to asylum-seekers, of whatever race or creed. (Greenslade 
2005: 6) 
In a context in which immigration policy has become increasingly concerned with 
distinguishing “deserving” from “undeserving” migrants, the status of asylum seekers has 
become particularly fraught (Flynn 2005; Sales 2005). 
There have been various well-publicized interventions to “crack down” on “bogus 
asylum seekers” by both Conservative and Labour administrations, whose measures have 
included reducing the benefits given to asylum applicants and a firmer approach to the 
detention and deportation of rejected applicants (Campbell 2012). Steadily rising 
numbers between 1990 and 2000, and changes in regulation that prevent asylum seekers 
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from earning their living and make them dependent on state welfare and benefits, led to 
massively rising public costs. In response, new policies were established including the 
detention of asylum applicants in detention centers if their claim is considered to be 
decided quickly. Moreover, under U.K. law, illegal entry into the country is now a 
criminal act. Consequently, use of the expertise and infrastructure provided by traffickers 
in order to arrive in a safe country further taints perceptions of migrants’ integrity (Koser 
2000). Official statistics show that the number of asylum applications to Britain has 
declined significantly over the last ten years, due in part, one might assume, to the 
effectiveness of some of these interventions. However, the debate about “bogus asylum 
seekers” has not lost force in public and policy discourses in a time of economic crisis 
and austerity measures. 
British policies mirror those followed in other European countries (Geddes 2003; 
Flynn 2005). Developments in E.U. immigration policy since the early 1990s have tended 
to limit the rights of refugees to enter the E.U. in order to seek asylum, and the policy that 
visa and entry documents should be applied for in the relevant embassy in the home 
country prior to travel, rather than upon arrival in the United Kingdom, places additional 
barriers for those who face indifference, hostility, or persecution from the authorities in 
their home country (Guild 2010). Asylum seekers are increasingly suspected of 
illegitimately claiming political persecution (Lynn and Lea 2003) and individuals in need 
of refuge face bureaucratic procedures that make it more difficult to leave one’s country 
and reach a safe destination. One result of bureaucratization and the tightening of 
immigration rules in Europe has been an increase asylum seekers’ reliance on clandestine 
methods of entry (Schuster 2011). Those seeking asylum in Europe depend more and 
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more on professional traffickers who are paid for providing transportation and often-
forged passports and identity documents. Traffickers are ‘experts’ on immigration 
policies, suitable travel routes and border control practice and often choose the country of 
arrival according to recent policy developments and practicalities. This leads to the 
separation of families or friendship networks. Asylum seekers report in interviews that 
they feel a lack of control about which country they go to and how. This weakens their 
confidence and their chances of integration into a new culture and society (Healey 2006; 
Korac 2003). 
In 2007, the British government reorganized its border control services and 
formed the U.K. Border Agency. This agency initiated a £1.2 billion “e-borders” program 
that accelerated the adoption of biometric and other new technologies in order to further 
enhance border control. The British government claimed that it was involved in 
“delivering the biggest shake-up of border security and the immigration system in a 
generation” (Cabinet Office 2009: 97). Nick Vaughan-Williams (2010) argues that 
identity management has become central to how the British Government has 
conceptualized border control. A 2007 U.K. Home Office White Paper states that 
“managing identity is fundamental” to effective border security and that the aim of the 
U.K.B.A. is to “fix people’s identities at the earliest point practicable” (Anon. 2007). The 
systematic biometric control of all tourist or business overseas travel aims at combating 
identity fraud and detecting suspicious movements. The U.K.B.A. also introduced a new 
process for the adjudication of asylum claims, called the New Asylum Model, whereby a 
U.K.B.A. staff member assumes the role of case owner and is responsible for all the 
decisions taken on an asylum application until the person is granted or denied permission 
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to stay. The case owner will conduct interviews with the applicant. A first interview aims 
to record details about how the applicant came to arrive in Britain and whether there was 
a relevant previous application for asylum either in Britain or another E.U. member state. 
A second interview, called the “asylum interview,” follows in which the applicant has the 
opportunity to give an account of why she or he wishes to apply for asylum. The 
overwhelming majority of asylum applications are rejected at this stage. The applicant 
then has the right of appeal and to be heard by an independent immigration judge. As 
Anthony Good (2009) argues, the outcome of this process largely depends on the 
credibility of the applicant’s own testimony regarding her or his history and reasons for 
arrival in Britain to claim asylum: 
When presenting their claims, most asylum applicants cannot produce documentary 
corroboration of their ill-treatment, and certainly cannot call as witnesses those who 
have persecuted them. Asylum decisions are therefore heavily dependent upon 
assessments of the credibility of their accounts, presented to the Home Office and 
the courts mainly in the forms of asylum interview transcripts and witness 
statements. (Good 2009:1) 
In a context where it is increasingly assumed that a high proportion of applicants do not 
tell the truth about their reasons for seeking admission to the country, the process is 
heavily weighted towards finding reasons to doubt the applicant’s testimony and reject 
the application. 
Given the uncertainties involved in assessing asylum applicants’ testimony, for 
some time now, the U.K.B.A. – along with border agencies in other countries – has 
sought other methods to inform decision making. A key method, in this respect, is the 
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controversial technique of language analysis (see Kam’s chapter in this volume). Since 
the early 2000s, it has become increasingly common for the U.K.B.A. to subcontract 
commercial firms to analyze the speech of asylum applicants, with the aim of 
determining whether they actually come from the country they claim (Campbell 2012). 
Since 2008, language analysis has been applied several thousand times to applicants 
presenting as Somalian refugees (Campbell 2012). Language analysis can be seen as a 
“technology of identification” aimed at establishing aspects of an applicant’s identity 
without relying on their personal testimony. 
In this context, the H.P.P.P. can be seen as an attempt to develop and implement 
additional technologies of identification that might potentially serve to establish 
nationality independently of such testimony and documentary evidence as asylum seekers 
can themselves provide. Justifying its investment in the H.P.P.P., the U.K.B.A. indicated 
that a “significant percentage of asylum applicants” might be engaging in “nationality-
swapping,” in particular applicants from the East African region. Kenyan nationals were 
allegedly seeking to pass themselves off as Somalis. The H.P.P.P. focused specifically on 
asylum applicants from that area to determine whether isotope and D.N.A. analysis could 
help to “identify at the outset of the asylum process those who are claiming under a false 
nationality” (U.K.B.A. 2009). 
The H.P.P.P. involved two such technologies: genetic testing for biogeographical 
origins – often referred to simply as ancestry testing – and isotope testing. These 
technologies were trialed specifically as an additional test to support language testing, 
which had been shown to be vulnerable to legal challenge in appeal hearings. Genetic 
ancestry testing and isotope analysis were to be undertaken in cases where personal 
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testimony and language analysis led U.K.B.A. officers to suspect that an individual who 
claimed to be from Somalia might actually be from another country. We now turn to an 
explanation of these technologies and the contexts in which they have developed. 
Technologies of Identification in the H.P.P.P. 
One important issue that the case of the H.P.P.P. highlights is the uncritical way in which 
technologies that had yet to establish their validity and utility in the context of forensic 
science and criminal investigation were nonetheless adopted into the asylum context – 
initially, at least, on the assumption that they could be useful in evaluating ‘live’ asylum 
applications. In this section, we focus on the background to how genetic ancestry testing 
and isotope testing came to be adopted in the H.P.P.P. 
It is important to understand how the genetic tests employed in the H.P.P.P. differ 
from other genetic technologies of identification. In the immigration context, D.N.A. 
testing is regularly used to determine biological relationships between individuals. This 
well-established and well-validated test involves looking at the degree of similarity 
between the D.N.A. of two individuals to determine whether they are biologically closely 
related, for instance as parent-child or siblings. Likewise, in forensic applications, routine 
D.N.A. identification is based on simple matching of D.N.A. profiles obtained from 
scene-of-crime D.N.A. traces with those from suspects. In contrast, the genetic tests for 
ancestry and geographical origins trialed in the H.P.P.P. were significantly more 
complex, and the inferences that can be drawn from them far more tenuous. 
Genetic ancestry tests emerged in the late 1990s out of decades of basic research 
on population genetics. They utilize knowledge of how genetic variations arise through 
mutation and accumulate within more or less isolated populations, which thus come to 
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embody distinctive combinations of gene variants. By analyzing particular genetic 
variants present in an individual’s D.N.A., it may therefore be possible to infer, with a 
reasonable degree of probability, that certain of that individual’s ancestors were members 
of a particular biogeographical population. However, there are very clear constraints on 
the precision and certainty with which such inferences can be drawn. The ability to trace 
ancestry to any particular population depends upon how precisely that population has 
been characterized in genetic terms: ancestry tracing is only as good as the genetic 
reference databases on which it draws. The construction of such databases is informed by 
prior assumptions about what counts as a population, and biogeographic identities are 
thus inevitably clouded by ethnic/racial and geopolitical presuppositions. Moreover, 
because D.N.A. variants are passed on through generations, it is difficult to infer just how 
recently an individual’s ancestors lived in a particular region. Consequently, a 
biogeographic origin test may show that a particular individual has shared ancestors with 
members of a population that now lives predominantly in a particular location, but says 
nothing about that individual’s own recent place of residence, and certainly offers no 
scientific mechanism for establishing her or his nationality. 
Despite these constraints, however, genetic testing for ancestry and geographical 
origins has come to be widely used, not only as a research tool by scientists interested in 
historical population movements but also as a consumer service (Shriver and Kittles 
2004). One important market is among private users interested in tracing their recent 
genealogical and ancestral history. The idea that genetic testing can help to throw light on 
an individual’s “roots” has been widely popularized in the media. The experiences of 
individuals who have undergone such testing to discover more about their family 
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histories and geographical origins provide compelling stories of personal identity and 
social history, and many such stories have featured in newspapers and magazine articles 
(Harmon 2007) and television programs (such as Motherland: A Genetic Journey, 
broadcast February 2003 on BBC television: see BBC 2003). As a result, hundreds of 
thousands of consumers have bought genetic ancestry tests over the past ten years 
(Wolinsky 2006: 1073). 
The marketing, uptake, and effects of these tests have in turn been examined by 
social scientists. Some reemphasize their scientific untrustworthiness, noting for instance 
that commercial genetic tests for biogeographical origins often do not take account of the 
large population movements that have taken place across Africa in the past two hundred 
to three hundred years, and urging that this may have implications for the truth of the 
origin and identity stories that consumers build around such tests (Royal et al. 2010; Lee 
et al. 2009; Scully et al. 2013). Some suggest that such limitations are unimportant, as 
genetic ancestry testing is little more than a harmless recreational indulgence. Thus U.S. 
bioethicist Henry Greely concludes that genetic genealogy is “interesting but arguably 
not very important … genealogy … [is] rarely of real significance” (Greely 2008: 229). 
This has been very much the orthodox view: regulators and policy advisors have given 
little serious consideration to genetic ancestry testing, on the assumption that the ethical 
issues at stake are far less critical than those related to medical genetics (e.g., Human 
Genetics Commission 2003). 
However, a growing number of social scientists argue that, despite its scientific 
and technical limitations, the dissemination of genetic ancestry testing into popular 
culture has the potential to effect far-reaching changes in ideas of identity, belonging, 
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history and race (Bolnick et al. 2007; Elliott and Brodwin 2002; Skinner 2006; Nelson 
2008; Tutton 2004; Nash 2004). In particular, they point to instances where genetic 
ancestry testing is used not just for recreational purposes, but for the express purpose of 
identifying membership of particular sociopolitical groups. For instance, such testing has 
been employed by Native Americans in the United States to determine tribal membership 
in ways that can exclude individuals who have traditionally been part of such tribes 
(Tallbear 2008; Beckenhauer 2003). In such cases, D.N.A. testing is being used to redraw 
the boundaries around certain social and political identities, sometimes with profound 
implications for how individuals and groups think about themselves and for the life 
choices available to them. Meanwhile, forensic agencies have also taken an active interest 
in genetic ancestry tests as a possible means of identifying or eliminating suspects in 
criminal investigations. Notably, in Britain, the Forensic Science Service has looked into 
the geographical distribution of particular Y chromosome variants, and their association 
with particular surnames, as a means of using scene-of-crime samples to narrow down the 
range of likely suspects (Vince 2006). 
Although genetic ancestry testing concentrates on tracing the genes of ancestors 
in contemporary human bodies, isotope testing is based on the way that the different 
environments in which an individual lives may leave distinctive traces in her or his body. 
The proportions of different isotopes of various chemical elements present in the 
environment vary from one locality to another. These elements are ingested in food and 
drinking water and are incorporated, over time, into body tissues. Consequently, 
assuming that a person consumes local food, water, and air, the proportions of different 
isotopes present in her or his tissues will mirror those in the place where he or she lives. 
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Moreover, because different tissues are laid down at different times in a person’s life, 
they embody a record of the person’s diet, and her or his movements over time. Adult 
teeth, for instance, are largely laid down between the ages of four and twenty, and may 
thus provide an indication of where a person lived as a child or young adult. Bone tissues, 
by contrast, are replaced over a period of several years, whereas hair and nails are 
replaced within a matter of months, so provide an indication of a person’s habitation or 
consumption within more recent time frames. 
We should note that, since both the number of naturally occurring isotopes and 
the range of possible variation are small, many different places in the world share similar 
isotope profiles. Consequently, isotope testing cannot be used to specify a unique location 
but may be useful as a way of eliminating options from a range of possible locations. 
These limitations are reflected in the way that archaeologists have used isotope testing to 
reconstruct the life course and migration of Neolithic and early mediaeval individuals 
from well-preserved skeletons (Evans et al. 2006; Budd et al. 2004): the confidence with 
which such reconstructions may be made is greatly aided by the fact that population 
movements at that time generally occurred over relatively small distances, thus reducing 
the range of possible places of origin, and that people consumed almost exclusively local 
food and water. 
By the early 2000s, isotope testing was also becoming incorporated into forensic 
techniques for tracing the origins of biological and chemical substances. Law 
enforcement agencies in North America and Europe formed networks with academic 
centers, forensic research laboratories and commercial laboratories to develop ways of 
applying isotope science to various aspects of law enforcement. Isotope analysis is now 
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routinely used to authenticate the origins of certain imported foods such as honey. More 
importantly for security purposes, in 1999 the Forensic Explosives Laboratory (F.E.L.) at 
Fort Halstead in Kent, England, was funded by the British Home Office to examine the 
utility of isotope ratios in the forensic analysis of explosives, with a view to tracing their 
movement through international terrorist networks (Doyle 2002). 
Crucially for the story of the H.P.P.P., genetic ancestry and isotope testing were 
used together for forensic purposes in the early 2000s in a rather unusual police 
investigation that became known as the Thames torso case. In September 2001, the 
Metropolitan Police began investigating a dismembered body of a young boy found in the 
river Thames in London. The unknown victim came to be known as “Adam.” Within a 
few months, the police came to focus on the theory that Adam was the victim of a 
ritualistic killing, which the British media repeatedly reported as an “African ritual 
murder” (Sanders 2003: 58). Although a number of Africanist anthropologists consulted 
by the Metropolitan Police contested this framing of what happened to the boy, arguing a 
lack of evidence to support this account, the detectives pursued this line of inquiry 
(Ranger 2007; Sanders 2003). As well as visiting Nigeria and South Africa, they 
employed the services of population geneticists and geochemists to help them determine 
the boy’s ancestry and place of origin. Mitochondrial D.N.A. analysis indicated that he 
was probably of West African origin, while analysis of the strontium isotopes in his 
bones was consistent with him having grown up in a “small area in north-west Africa, 
probably a rural area near the city of Benin in south-western Nigeria” (in Ranger 2007: 
272). As a result of a witness coming forward, police now believe they have identified 
the boy and have spoken to relatives still living in Nigeria (Quinn 2011). Though the 
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perpetrators have never been found, the case generated considerable media interest and 
much of the original investigation was documented by a film crew and shown on British 
television. 
A direct link can be drawn between this case and the H.P.P.P. The detective in 
charge of the Thames torso investigation was Detective Inspector Will O’Reilly. He is 
credited with being responsible both for proposing the H.P.P.P. and for securing its 
funding from the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office (F.C.O.) under its Returns 
and Reintegration Fund, with “full Ministerial support” (Douglas 2009). On retiring from 
the Metropolitan Police he became the project manager of the H.P.P.P., and – it is 
claimed – went on to assist in the construction of “isotopic and ancestral DNA databases 
for the forensic use of law enforcement agencies worldwide” (Anon. 2012). It would 
appear that the H.P.P.P. was directly inspired by O’Reilly’s experience of using these 
new and still relatively untested technologies of identification in the Adam torso case. We 
now consider whether these new technologies can appropriately be transferred to the 
assessment of asylum applications. 
Substituting Biology for Nationality 
Recent years have seen a massive intensification in the use of new technologies of 
identification – including biometrics and networked information technology as well as 
language analysis – not just for evaluating the credibility of asylum applicants, but for 
routine purposes of border control. Such technologies are concerned with identity, not as 
experienced by individuals but as assigned by impersonal, suspicious, and often hostile 
agencies. As Louise Amoore (2011) has argued, they diminish the agency of all who 
cross international borders, by depriving them of their right to tell their own stories (see 
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also Feldman 2012). The use of biometric and linguistic technologies shifts the evidence 
from the applicant’s personal narrative of persecution to seemingly objective means of 
assessing certain aspects of identity. However, such technologies of identification do not 
simply offer more objective means of confirming or disconfirming conventional identity 
claims. They actually redefine the social categories of identity on which immigration and 
asylum decisions are based. Thus, genetic family relationship testing replaces the social 
category of kinship with the biological category of genetic relatedness; as other observers 
have noted, since biological relatedness does not necessarily map onto kinship, for 
instance where children are adopted, this may do violence to family relationships and 
cause renewed distress to those seeking asylum (Heinemann and Lemke 2013). The 
H.P.P.P. went even further in seeking to employ biological categories of ancestry and life 
history as a proxy for the social category of nationality. Criticism of the H.P.P.P. has 
focused primarily on the viability of this substitution. 
With regard to isotope testing, critics pointed out that archaeologists and forensic 
investigators are typically able to base their inferences about individuals’ origins and 
movements on measurements from a range of tissues, including teeth and bone as well as 
hair and fingernails. By contrast, U.K.B.A. officials could not take tooth or bone samples 
from asylum applicants, so were limited to observations of hair and fingernails, which 
only provide information about an applicant’s likely diet over a short period of time. This 
placed very severe limits on what can be inferred from such measurements. Asylum 
applicants often spend protracted periods away from their home country before arriving 
at their country of destination. Many Somali refugees, for instance, spend years in 
refugee camps outside their home country, while those who resort to human trafficking 
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networks may spend long periods being moved from one place to another before being 
delivered to Britain. Even in instances when individuals come directly to Britain from 
their home country, their diet in the previous months could often be heavily 
supplemented with imported food, particularly in countries such as Somalia that receive 
significant quantities of food aid. All of these factors will mean that the isotopes present 
in asylum applicants’ hair and nails may bear little relationship to those found in their 
home country. In consequence, it is difficult to see how isotope analysis could provide 
meaningful information about the origins of asylum applicants subjected to the H.P.P.P. 
It might, however, provide evidence consistent with an individual having recently spent 
time in another country outside their country of origin – which the U.K.B.A. typically 
sees as sufficient reason to reject an asylum application, as it assumes that the applicant 
can safely be returned to that other country. 
Moreover, the use of isotope testing to indicate whether a person’s biological 
makeup is consistent with them having spent time in a particular region depends on 
having sufficiently detailed information about the distribution of the relevant 
environmental isotopes across that region. Such data for Somalia are very sketchy; while 
the situation there makes it unlikely that accurate mapping will be undertaken in the 
foreseeable future. Similar objections have been made to the use of genetic ancestry 
testing under the H.P.P.P. Critics pointed out that there is little detailed information about 
the genetics of Somali populations; the present political situation effectively prohibits the 
kind of research that would be necessary to generate such information. Even if such 
research were possible, significant and often chaotic population movements prompted by 
the political situation would likely render the resulting data unreliable in a relatively short 
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time. The U.K.B.A. sought to get around these problems by compiling information on the 
genetics of various Kenyan populations, on the grounds that the majority of “bogus” 
Somali asylum seekers were thought to come from Kenya – but without proper 
knowledge of the genetic similarities, differences, and overlaps between Kenyan and 
Somali populations, such information is meaningless. 
This leads to another even more fundamental issue: namely, that biological 
information about population genetics or environmental circumstances has no necessary 
relationship to the social categories of national identity and citizenship. As the journal 
Nature put it, “the idea that genetic variability follows man-made national boundaries is 
absurd” (Nature 2009). Exactly the same point can be made about language analysis 
(Campbell 2013). On the one hand, national borders have often been drawn in ways that 
cut across existing population groupings – as for instance in Eastern Africa, where ethnic 
Somalis are found on both sides of the border that divides Somalia from Kenya. On the 
other hand, national borders rarely represent a complete barrier to human migration and 
relations, and such migrations may be especially large in wartorn areas such as the Horn 
of Africa. In sum, genetic testing, and information about probable place of recent 
residence provide no guide to nationality. 
Conclusion 
The H.P.P.P. ended on March 31, 2010. Initially, the U.K.B.A. had promised to publish a 
full review of the project. In the event, no such review was ever conducted. By way of 
explanation, the U.K.B.A. responded to a Freedom of Information request by one of the 
authors as follows: 
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Following the conclusion of the pilot, a decision was taken within the U.K. Border 
Agency not to take forward D.N.A./Isotope testing for country of origin 
identification purposes in the foreseeable future. On the basis of this decision, it 
was agreed that resources would not be devoted carrying out an evaluation of the 
pilot at this point in time. If a decision to resume Familial D.N.A. or Country of 
Origin testing is taken in the future, further consideration will be given to the 
scientific, legal and ethical basis on which it would operate. The Home Office 
would engage with relevant experts to address any concerns that may be raised 
regarding the use of this technique. (Martin 2011) 
The U.K.B.A. response also detailed that 198 familial relationship tests were carried out 
over 76 family groups, while a total of 38 individuals were tested as part of the “country 
of origin” element of the H.P.P.P. (Martin 2011). It is notable that, while the U.K.B.A. 
states that it has no plans to develop these techniques in the “foreseeable future,” it leaves 
open the possibility that the U.K. government may decide “to resume … Country of 
Origin testing … in the future.” 
At first sight, this appears to be a very odd response. Given that a wide range of 
experts, including population geneticists and environmental chemists as well as lawyers 
and social scientists, had argued that the scientific assumptions on which the H.P.P.P. 
was founded are fundamentally flawed, why did the U.K.B.A. not acknowledge this 
criticism by definitively ruling out the possibility of using molecular techniques to 
determine nationality in future? The answer, we would argue, lies in the way the 
U.K.B.A. frames aims and means of border control more generally. The H.P.P.P. was 
indicative of a broader set of trends by which technologies, practices, and modes of 
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thought from the context of criminal investigation have come to shape the asylum system. 
The sociologists Robin Williams and Paul Johnson have argued persuasively that the 
establishment and use by U.K. police of the forensic National D.N.A. Database should be 
seen as part of a larger paradigm shift in policing: from a criminal justice paradigm, 
premised on a concern to deliver justice equally to all citizens, to a crime management 
paradigm, concerned rather with identifying and managing what is taken to be an 
inherently criminal element within society (Williams and Johnson 2008). According to 
Williams and Johnson, the routine use of technologies of identification like the National 
D.N.A. Database has been a vital element in realizing the crime management paradigm, 
by providing an effective means of both identifying and incriminating that criminal 
element. 
In that light, the H.P.P.P. appears to be part of a similar shift in asylum 
procedures: from a humanitarian paradigm motivated by a concern to provide shelter for 
the victims of human rights abuses, to a border control paradigm concerned with 
restricting the movement of would-be immigrants. In the border control case as in the 
crime management case, new technologies of identification provide a means of 
identifying and excluding suspect individuals from the rights and privileges enjoyed by 
ordinary citizens. Moreover, these parallels are more than just accidental, or attributable 
to some more general shift in government ideology. They also involve direct exchange of 
technology and expertise between the respective government agencies. The H.P.P.P. was 
actively promoted and subsequently managed by ex-Detective Inspector Will O’Reilly, 
who had previously employed the same technologies of identification in forensic police 
work. Moreover, the U.K.B.A. anticipated that the results of the H.P.P.P. would 
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eventually be evaluated by the Forensic Science Regulator, an ombudsman responsible 
for ensuring that forensic services meet appropriate standards of scientific quality 
(Vorhaus 2009). In effect, the H.P.P.P. marked a distinct convergence of personnel, 
technology and practice between policing and border control. Seen in this light, the 
H.P.P.P. was clearly a further step in the de facto criminalization of asylum applicants 
that we described at the beginning of this chapter. 
Once we appreciate this, we can begin to understand why the U.K.B.A. remained 
relatively unmoved by criticism from scientists and others. What matters, from a border 
control perspective, is not so much the need to distinguish legitimate from illegitimate 
asylum applicants, but rather the need to manage and control the flow of individuals into 
the country. The U.K.B.A.’s attitude towards the new molecular technologies of 
identification trialled in the H.P.P.P. reflects this perspective. Faced with concerted 
criticism of the scientific viability of the H.P.P.P., the U.K.B.A. responded, not by 
mobilizing contrary scientific arguments, but by raising a very different point: whatever 
the scientific case, the H.P.P.P. had at least proved to be an effective deterrent, as 
measured by a significant reduction in the number of asylum claims during the time it 
was in operation.4 This response is telling. It is of course impossible to say how many of 
those deterred by the additional barriers imposed under the H.P.P.P. were legitimate 
applicants and how many were bogus. But as far as the U.K.B.A. was concerned, that 
seems to have been beside the point. What mattered was that application numbers had 
fallen. This has implications for what was expected of the new technologies of 
identification. In order to be of use in restricting the influx of asylum seekers, it was not 
necessary for those technologies to provide an accurate or reliable means of determining 
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the nationality of any individual. All that was required was that they be effective in 
challenging and undermining the personal testimony on which asylum applications are 
based. Given the presumption that most asylum seekers are illegitimate, the policy aims 
to deter all whose from applying who may find their prospect of being accepted improved 
elsewhere, independent of whether or not they are genuine refugees. 
In effect, these molecular biotechnologies and other tests only serve as 
“technologies of suspicion” (Campbell 2004), without having to meet the higher 
standards of technical certainty required of technologies of truth in science and judicial 
proceedings. That the U.K.B.A. and the forensic experts with whom they worked chose 
not to engage with the criticisms of external scientific experts suggests that it was the 
former standards that they worked to, not the latter. 
The priorities behind the introduction of the H.P.P.P. are evident: it was motivated 
at least as much by a desire to discourage asylum seekers from applying as by any 
concern to identify and provide refuge for legitimate refugees. The use of new 
technologies of identification under the H.P.P.P. and the highly selective attitude towards 
different forms of technical expertise demonstrated by the U.K.B.A. were entirely in 
keeping with this orientation. In the event, it appears that concerted and sustained 
criticism ultimately led the Border Agency to shelve the use of genetic and isotope testing 
for country of origin. But as we have seen, the Agency also declined to foreclose the 
possibility that such use will be revived in the future. Meanwhile, the political impetus to 
further restrict immigration into the United Kingdom, including admission of asylum 
seekers, persists – and, with it, the motivation to adopt new technologies of identification 
to challenge the testimony of asylum applicants. Consequently, the H.P.P.P. stands as a 
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salutary warning of the ways in which new technologies are increasingly being used at 
international borders as means of disempowering the vulnerable. But more than that, the 
way that the U.K.B.A. has responded to criticism by scientists and other external experts 
serves as a reminder that expertise and the salience of technical arguments depends on 
context: within the context of U.K. border control, certain kinds of argument and 
expertise clearly count for more than others. If the use of new technologies to deny the 
rights of refugees is to be countered, that context, and its implications for the politics and 
deployment of expertise, needs to be understood. 
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publishers for permission to publish the present version. 
2 The language of “fortress Europe” is widely used, particularly by critics of E.U. immigration 
policy. For recent examples, see “Fortress Europe: How the E.U. Turns Its Back on Refugees,” 
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Spiegel Online, October 9, 2013, http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/asylum-policy-
and-treatment-of-refugees-in-the-european-union-a-926939.html [retrieved December 20, 
2013]; “Fortress Europe ‘Miserably Failing’ Syrian Refugees,” The Week, December 13, 2013, 
http://www.theweek.co.uk/world-news/syria/56501/fortress-europe-miserably-failing-syrian-
refugees [retrieved December 20, 2013]. 
3 The right to seek asylum in another country is enshrined in international law, such as 
the 1951 United Nations Refugee Convention that defines a refugee as someone who 
‘owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the 
country of his nationality, and is unable to, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail 
himself of the protection of that country’ (U.N.H.C.R. 2012). 
4 Will O’Reilly from the U.K.B.A. made this claim at a meeting with members of the 
H.G.C. in Hinxton, Cambridge, in February 2010 (H.G.C 2010). 
